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I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff-appellant, Laina Roundy, submits this Brief in reply to the Brief 
of defendant-appellee, Travis Staley. 
Ms. Roundy stands by her legal analysis, and its application to the instant 
dispute, set forth in her Opening Brief. She seeks to refrain from unnecessarily 
repeating the arguments, regarding the correctness of which she remains confident, that 
appear in that Brief. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. THE INADEQUACY OF MR. STALEYS OBJECTIONS, THE 
LACK OF FAIR NOTICE THAT MS. ROUNDY WOULD HAVE 
TO FILE A MOTION TO COMPEL TO DISCOVER THE 
PLANNED TESTIMONY AND VIDEOTAPE, AND THE LIKELY 
FUTILITY OF SUCH A MOTION 
Mr. Staley argues that Ms. Roundy should have filed a Motion to Compel, 
but his subject discovery responses gave Ms. Roundy no notice of the existence of the 
videotape, or of Mr. Gunderson, or of the planned testimony of Dr. Moress. 
Mr. Staley's responses identified some witnesses and some documents, without 
suggesting there was a videotape or a Mr. Gunderson, and they failed to put 
Ms. Roundy on notice that there was anything to be compelled in the event the District 
Court should grant a motion to compel. 
Interrogatory No. 3 (quoted in Ms. Roundy's Opening Brief at 13 and in 
Mr. Staley's Brief at 5) sought, among other things, the identity of all individuals with 
information concerning the allegations of Ms. Roundy's Complaint and asked 
Mr. Staley to include in his Answer a brief summary of information possessed by such 
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persons. Among those allegations were damages allegations, set forth in paragraphs 37-
40 of the Complaint. R. at 5-6. Mr. Staley's Answer to that Interrogatory (also quoted 
at the referenced pages of Ms. Roundy's Opening Brief and Mr. Staley's Brief) 
interposed no objection to the question about the Complaint and stated, simply: 
"Plaintiff would best know who has information about their Complaint/' Ms. Roundy 
did not, of course, know about Mr. Gunderson, and he, as the surveillance person, had 
information regarding the Complaint's allegations regarding Ms. Roundy's physical 
condition. His name was never mentioned. Nor was Ms. Roundy ever given a "brief 
summary" — or any indication ~ of the information that Mr. Gunderson had. 
In her Rule 26(e) Request for Supplementation, Ms. Roundy requested 
that Mr. Staley supplement his earlier responses. Mr. Staley's supplemental responses 
(set forth in Ms. Roundy's Brief at 14 and in Mr. Staley's Brief at 6-8) included his 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 2, in which he stated that his counsel had not yet made 
decisions on what witnesses would be called, but in which he also listed several persons 
by name. His supplemental responses also included his Answer to Interrogatory No. 6, 
which asked him to identify all documents that he intended to use at trial. Mr. Staley's 
Answer dealt only with "exhibits" (presumably documents his counsel contemplated 
introducing into evidence) and listed numerous documents and categories of documents. 
It said nothing about a surveillance video, and it gave no hint of its existence. Nor did 
it object on a work-product basis. 
Mr. Staley's supplemental Answer to Interrogatory No. 4, dealing with 
expert witnesses, designated Dr. Gerald Moress, but said nothing about his commentary 
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on the videotape. 
Likely worthy of note are the facts that, on April 9, 1997, weeks after 
Mr. Gunderson had done the surveillance work that went into the videotape (Gunderson 
trial testimony, Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings, at 221; 225), Mr. Staley further 
supplemented his Answers to Interrogatories (with the names of additional experts) (R. 
at 513-16) but that, even in that submission, he did not disclose the name of 
Mr. Gunderson, the videotape, or Dr. Moress's planned testimony regarding the 
videotape. Mr. Staley did no further supplementation. 
In these circumstances, Mr. Staley cannot persuasively contend that 
Ms. Roundy's remedy was to file and pursue a motion to compel. How was she to 
know, given Mr. Staley's responses, that there was anything to compel? Also, based on 
the District Court's treatment of the issue during the colloquy that transpired during trial 
(Add, to Ms. Roundy's Opening Brief at 19-20), it appears that any such motion would 
have been futile. 
B. THE SUFFICIENCY OF MS. ROUNDY'S DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
AND REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTATION 
A central theme of Mr. Staley's argument (see, e.g., the heading of Part 
LA. of his Argument (appearing at page 12 of his Brief) is that Ms. Roundy's appeal is 
doomed by her failure specifically to request, in the discovery process, the production 
of information regarding surveillance evidence. A careful review, however, of 
Ms. Roundy's discovery requests, as well as the cases relied on by Mr. Staley, leads to 
the conclusion that that contention is fallacious. There is nothing in the Rules that 
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requires a litigant specifically to request surveillance-related evidence. Ms. Roundy's 
subject requests were broadly but comprehensively worded, and a fair reading of 
Mr. Staley's responses, which reveal the names of a number of witnesses and a large 
number of categories of documents, leads to the conclusion that a litigant in 
Ms. Roundy's position would see no need specifically to inquire about the existence, or 
planned evidentiary presentation concerning, surveillance evidence. 
There is, further, nothing in any of the cases cited by Mr. Staley, or in 
any case unearthed by Ms. Roundy's counsel, that stands for the proposition that 
interrogatories worded as Ms. Roundy's are worded do not fairly put opposing counsel 
on notice of a litigant's desire to obtain pre-trial disclosure of the kind of information 
that is at issue here. In Feola v. Egan, 1998 WL 666964 (Conn. Super.), the trial court 
stated, in pertinent part: 
... the plaintiff points to no interrogatory or discovery proceeding, or other 
form of procedure, that would have called for the defendant to reveal the 
existence of a videotape. 
Here, Ms. Roundy's interrogatories, calling for the identity of witnesses, the nature of 
their testimony, and a description of documents (including, by definition — see 
definition of "document" or "documents" set forth at pages 2-3 of the Addendum to 
Ms. Roundy's Opening Brief — videotapes) Mr. Staley intended to use at trial, clearly 
called for Mr. Staley to reveal his planned evidentiary presentation. 
In Detillier v. Smith, 638 So.2d 445 (La. App. 1994), the videotape was 
made during the trial Probably more important is the fact that there is no mention 
whatsoever in that case of any discovery requests. In Kiss v. Jacob, 633 A.2d 544 
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(N.J. App. 1993), the problem was that the plaintiffs' counsel, having been informed by 
the defendant's counsel that "photographs" of the plaintiff existed and were available for 
inspection, did not take defendant's counsel up on his offer that plaintiffs counsel could 
review the "photographs" prior to trial. The dynamics of the instant case are, of course, 
completely different. 
Instructive on this issue are the following emphasized remarks of the court 
in Hoey v. Hawkins, 332 A.2d 403 (Del. 1975), a case which reversed the trial court's 
denial of the plaintiffs motion for a new trial and which also eloquently explains the 
important policy principles underlying Ms. Roundy's position in this Appeal: 
There is an obvious tension between pretrial disclosure and the raw spirit 
of adversariness. Chancellor (then Judge) Quillen summed up the 
countervailing positions in Olszewski v. Howell Del.Super. 253 A.d 77 
(1969): 
"... On the one hand, a plaintiff shows need for protection against 
the rather distasteful business of having an opposing litigant 
possibly use, and even misuse, motion pictures of the plaintiff, 
taken secretly without the plaintiffs knowledge and consent, in a 
manner deliberately designed to impeach the plaintiff's credibility 
and to degrade the plaintiff generally. On the other hand, a 
defendant demonstrates a need to protect himself against a possible 
exaggerated claim, and even false claim, of personal injury and 
shows that a premature disclosure of the impeachment evidence 
could result in a conscious or subconscious tailoring of the 
plaintiff's case in chief to meet the challenge." 
The Court there found good cause had been established for production, 
recognizing the 
"... well established policy of pretrial disclosure which is based on 
a rationale that a trial decision should result from a disinterested 
search for truth from all the available evidence rather than tactical 
5 
maneuvers based on the calculated manipulation of evidence and its 
production/' 
It appears that the apparently damaging evidence in controversy here was 
intentionally and not inadvertently secreted by defendant during the 
discovery stage. It makes no difference that defendant's counsel did not 
know anything about the film until the eve of trial. Indeed, that tends to 
emphasize the hidden and surprise aspects of what was done. A party 
certainly cannot avoid his duty under the Rules to give discovery by 
withholding facts from his own counsel. 
The obvious tactical objective sought was to surprise and that does not 
comport with the spirit of the Discovery Rules. We thought that had been 
settled almost twenty years ago as Chief Justice (then Judge) Hermann 
wrote in The New Rules of Civil Procedure in Delaware, Del. 18 F.R.D. 
327 (1956): 
"... In the application of the new Rules, we see a complete reversal 
of attitude as to discovery. Each party is now entitled to the use of 
any relevant information in the possession of the other party, if not 
privileged. Depositions, interrogatories, inspection of books and 
records, medical examination, and requests for admission are 
discovery devices now in widespread and constant use in this 
jurisdiction. 
Broad and liberal discovery has revolutionized litigation in 
Delaware courts. By use of available discovery devices, a lawyer 
may now come to trial almost as familiar with his opponent's case 
as with his own. The objection to the "fishing expedition' is 
repudiated, surprise has been reduced to a minimum and the 
' sporting theory of justice7 has been eliminated in the interest of 
the ascertainment of truth. The exponents of surprise testimony as 
the best weapon against a perjurious adversary become fewer and 
fewer as experience proves the contrary view. Discovery under the 
Rules may enable a party to establish the legal rights which might 
have been otherwise denied to him. Discovery and pretrial 
practices usually result in the narrowing and clarifying of issues so 
as to shorten trials and to bring about a greater degree of clarity 
and justice in the presentation of facts to jurors." 
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We take the occasion to emphasis that purpose and spirit of the Discovery 
Rules. 
Defendant's failure to disclose the pertinent facts does not conform to the 
letter of the Discovery Rules. Plaintiffs interrogatories directed defendant 
to disclose the identity of persons who had knowledge of the facts alleged 
in the pleading or had been interviewed in defendant's behalf. Defendant 
contends that the scope of these questions was too broad to require 
disclosure about the identity of the detective, absent a particularized query 
as to films or photos. We disagree. 
332 A.2d at 405-06 (emphasis added). 
Also unavailing to Mr. Staley is his attempt to cause this Court to believe 
that a case cited by Ms. Roundy in her Opening Brief, Dodson v. PerselL 390 So.2d 
704 (Fla. 1980), actually supports Mr. Staley's position. The fact that, in Dodson, the 
plaintiffs counsel specifically requested the pre-trial disclosure of surveillance-related 
evidence does not mean that discovery requests of the kind Ms. Roundy propounded are 
not sufficient. Nor, of course, is it of any assistance to Mr. Staley's position in this 
Appeal that Ms. Roundy, unlike the plaintiff in Dodson, did not file a motion to compel 
pre-trial disclosure. For, unlike the defendant's counsel in Dodson, Mr. Staley's counsel 
did not prior to trial disclose the existence of the evidence, and, unlike the plaintiff in 
Dodson, Ms. Roundy had no reason to think that the evidence even existed. 
This Court should, as a result of common judicial sense, and as the 
Delaware Supreme Court did in Hoey, hold that Ms. Roundy's subject Interrogatories 
were sufficient to cause Mr. Staley's counsel to disclose the subject surveillance and 
surveillance-related evidence, in seasonable fashion prior to trial. 
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C THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE "WORK-PRODUCT" DOC-
TRINE 
Mr. Staley, in his Brief, at 15, appears for the first time to contend that 
the surveillance evidence was "privileged work product until it was decided it would be 
used at trial." A review of Mr. Staley's subject discovery responses (see, e.g., 
Mr. Staley's Brief at 5-8) will reveal that no such objection was made to any of the 
subject Interrogatories. Accordingly, that objection, if it were valid and had anything to 
do with the instant dispute, was waived. If the objection had not been waived, and 
even if Mr. Staley's counsel had not, prior to trial, determined to use the surveillance 
and surveillance-related evidence (including the (to Ms. Roundy and her counsel) 
unforeseen, and unforeseeable, testimony of Dr. Moress - referenced at pages 7-8, 
footnote 1, and page 16 of Ms. Roundy's Opening Brief), the work-product doctrine 
would have been unavailing. For, in the words of Rule 26(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Ms. Roundy had ~ and would have been able to demonstrate this to 
the District Court if she'd known what was afoot ~ 
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of [her] case and ... 
was unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of 
the materials by other means. 
Instructive on this point are the observations of the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
Jenkins v. Rainner. 350 A.2d 473, 477 (N.J. 1976): 
We turn to the provision of R. 4:10-2(c) [apparently, the New Jersey 
equivalent of Rule 26(b)(3)] that the party seeking discovery must be 
"unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the 
materials by other means." Plaintiff contends this requirement is met by 
the impossibility of creating the equivalent of the motion pictures, they 
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having been taken sometime in the eighteen month period prior to 
Waldman's deposition. 
The point does not require much exposition. If the evidence is unique, 
such that a party cannot copy or otherwise recreate it, then the hardship in 
obtaining a substantial equivalent seems manifest. Defendants do not 
offer any suggestion as to what steps plaintiff might now take to repro-
duce the evidence contained in their motion pictures. The likelihood of 
any substitute, were we able to think of one, being the substantial 
equivalent of the films is slim indeed, given the tremendous impact of 
movies. See Balian v. General Motors, 121 N.J.Super. 188, 128, 296 
A.2d 317 (App. Div. 1972); Paradis, 'The Celluloid Witness/' 37 U. Colo. 
L. Rev. 235. Plaintiff herein has satisfied the requirement of the Rule. 
See, also, a case relied on by Mr. Staley for its "harmless error" analysis, McDougal v. 
McCammon. 455 S.E.2d 788, 796 n. 9 (W.Va. 1995): "Obviously, the defendant 
cannot consider this a serious argument." "... the defendant's tactics border on 
misconduct." Id., n. 10. Finally, the work-product doctrine applies only to documents, 
and it offers Mr. Staley no aid with respect to his refusal to provide the requested 
information regarding witnesses and the areas of their expected testimony. 
D. THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF THE LACK OF A PRE-TRIAL 
ORDER REQUIRING DISCLOSURE OF WITNESSES AND 
EXHIBITS 
Mr. Staley makes much of the fact that there was no District Court order, 
in this case, that required the parties to identify witnesses or exhibits and seeks, on that 
basis, to distinguish authorities such as Lascano v. Vowell 940 P.2d 977 (Colo. App. 
1996), brought to the Court's attention by Ms. Roundy in her Opening Brief. There is 
nothing, however, in Utah law or policy — or, to Ms. Roundy's counsel's knowledge, in 
American jurisprudence at large — that allows a party to rest on the absence of such an 
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order in an effort to evade his, her, or its obligation to answer Interrogatories in a 
forthright fashion or to supplement Answers in timely fashion. The fact that there was 
no such order in this case does not lead to the conclusion that Mr. Staley could flout 
the discovery Rules. 
E. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN 
THE NON-SURVEILLANCE EVIDENCE CASES CITED BY 
MS. ROUNDY 
Mr. Staley in essence urges this Court to ignore authorities such as Perez-
Perez v. Popular Leasing Rental Inc., 993 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1993), and Smith v. Ford 
Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1980), simply because they don't deal specifically 
with surveillance evidence. It is for the general principles of pre-trial disclosure that 
Ms. Roundy has cited these cases. Regardless of Mr. Staley's apparent attempt to 
convince the Court that surveillance evidence cases are sui generis, Ms. Roundy urges 
the Court to consider those named cases, and the others cited in those cases (including 
those mentioned at 19-20 of Ms. Roundy's Opening Brief), for their analyses of 
discovery abuses, unfair surprise, and results reached, including reversals of judgments 
on jury verdicts and denials of motions for new trial. 
F. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MS. ROUNDYS DEPOSITION 
TESTIMONY 
Mr. Staley makes much of his supposed planned use of the surveillance 
evidence only if it eventuated, at trial, that Ms. Roundy would lie about her physical 
limitations. The fact of the matter is that Ms. Roundy's deposition was taken twice (the 
second time on May 1, 1997, after Mr. Gunderson's surveillance work was done and a 
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week before the trial began). In the deposition process, Ms. Roundy testified 
essentially as she did at trial. Tr. of proceedings of September 5, 1997, at 9-10. 
Mr. Staley's counsel knew, based on that deposition testimony, how Ms. Roundy would 
testify, at trial, regarding her physical limitations. See, also, Ms. Roundy's trial 
testimony. Tr. of May 13, 1997 proceedings at 57-63; 201 (direct examination); 220-
234 (cross-examination, including (beginning at 226) questions dealing with that second 
deposition testimony); tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings at 231-34. Mr. Staley's 
contention that he would use the surveillance evidence only if he should be "surprised" 
by her trial testimony is thus unmasked as a sham. If this aspect of Mr. Staley's 
argument is significant to the Court, and if the Court needs any more support1 for the 
proposition that the surveillance evidence was not true "rebuttal" evidence, this should 
do it. 
G- MR. STALEY'S ERRONEOUS AND LOGICALLY FLAWED 
ARGUMENT THAT MS- ROUNDY COULD HAVE GUARDED 
AGAINST THE SURPRISE EVIDENCE 
Mr. Staley argues, in Point II of his Brief, that Ms. Roundy could, with 
"ordinary prudence," have guarded against the surprise testimony of Dr. Moress and 
Mr. Gunderson and the surprise videotape itself. The first prong of Mr. Staley's 
argument ~ that Ms. Roundy should have propounded discovery requests dealing 
specifically with surveillance evidence and could have filed a motion to compel ~ has 
already been addressed. The second prong ~ that Ms. Roundy could have avoided the 
*See, also, the quote from the Hoey case set forth at 5-7, supra; and the quote from 
the Jenkins case set forth at 12-13, infra. 
1 1 
surprise by simply testifying "honestly and consistently" (Mr. Staley's Brief at 19) — is 
most curious. First, and as stated in her Opening Brief at 8, Ms. Roundy maintains, 
although she acknowledges that the jury - especially after Dr. Moress testified — may 
have viewed this differently, that she was candid in her testimony. Ms. Roundy 
suggests, in this connection, that the Court compare her trial testimony (Tr. of May 13, 
1997 proceedings at 57-63; 201; 220-34; tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings at 231-34) 
with the surveillance videotape (Mr. Staley's Exhibit 23-D) and with Dr. Moress's 
testimony (Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings at 22-23). Second, Ms. Roundy urges the 
Court to recognize the logical fallacy of Mr. Staley's contention. Without citing any 
case or other authority for the proposition, Mr. Staley asks this Court to conclude that 
his counsel's version of truthfulness is "ordinary prudence,,/ as contemplated by Rule 
59(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The proposition that a surveillance 
videotape is ever "the exclusive repository of truth and virtue" was soundly and 
eloquently debunked by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Jenkins v. Rainner, 350 A.2d 
473, 476-477 (NJ. 1976), a case of which Ms. Roundy respectfully suggests this Court 
take particular notice. That court there observed, in the course of reversing a trial 
court: 
Twenty-five years ago Chief Justice Vanderbilt pointed out: 
Our Rules for discovery ... are designed to insure that the outcome 
of litigation in this State shall depend on its merits in the light of 
all of the available facts, rather than on the craftiness of the parties 
or the guile of their counsel. HLang v. Morgan's Home Equip. 
Corp., 6 N.J. 333, 338, 78 A.2d 705, 707 (1951).] 
This policy is in keeping with the modern trend which recognizes "the 
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need to make available to each party the widest possible sources of proof 
as early as may be so as to avoid surprise and facilitate preparation/' 
McCormick, op. cit. supra, § 96 at 202. 
Quite aside from its departure from this long-established policy, defen-
dants' position suffers from an obvious analytical weakness: it is based on 
the premises that defendants' evidence (in the form of the undercover 
films) is the exclusive repository of truth and virtue and its disclosure 
prior to trial will deprive them of the opportunity to demonstrate to the 
jurors the fraud plaintiff seeks to work upon them. While defendants do 
not state that assumption quite so bluntly, their argument rests upon it at 
least implicitly. The premise is one we can hardly indulge. It is no more 
unlikely that a defendant may resort to chicanery in fabricating motion 
pictures of one alleged to be the plaintiff than it is that a plaintiff may 
indeed be a faker. The camera itself may be an instrument of deception, 
capable of being misused with respect to distances, lighting, camera 
angles, speed, editing and splicing, and chronology. Hence, "that which 
purports to be a means to reach the truth may be distorted, misleading, 
and false." Snead v. Amer. Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 148, 
150 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
The surprise which results from distortion of misidentification is plainly 
unfair. If it is unleashed at the time of trial, the opportunity for an 
adversary to protect against its damaging inference by attacking the 
integrity of the film and developing counter-evidence is gone or at least 
greatly diminished. The delay which would inevitably ensue from an 
interruption of the trial to permit examination and perhaps testing of the 
films should be avoided. If on the other hand the motion pictures actually 
portray plaintiff engaged in some strenuous activity which on depositions 
she had already testified is beyond her capacity, then it is not probable 
that pretrial disclosure of that kind of inconsistence will enable her to 
salvage the case; more likely it will hasten a settlement. If the inconsis-
tency is not glaring or is susceptible of explanation, or if for other reasons 
settlement opportunities are not enhanced, then the adversarial system will 
be called upon to work, but now in the environment in which it works 
most efficiently — where the parties are aware of all the evidence. 
(Emphasis added.) Ms. Roundy urges the Court soundly to reject Mr. Staley's 
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contention that the surprise in this case was one that "ordinary prudence" could have 
guarded against. 
H. "IRREGULARITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS" AND "ERROR IN 
LAW" 
Mr. Staley asks this Court to accept the proposition that there was nothing 
"irregular" about the conduct of Mr. Staley's counsel, or about the District Court's 
allowing the subject evidence, in the interest of courtroom drama (see discussion in 
Ms. Roundy's Brief, at 7), that denied Ms. Roundy a fair trial. Ms. Roundy concedes 
that her counsel has been unable to find any case law applying an "irregularity" analysis 
to a history such as this, but urges the Court to recognize, as an alternative basis for 
granting her a new trial, that the lack of case law does not necessarily mean that the 
analysis does not fit this history. 
Mr. Staley also urges the Court to accept the proposition that the District 
Court's admission of the surveillance and surveillance-related evidence does not amount 
to an "error in law." Again, as with the "irregularity" aspect of her argument, 
Ms. Roundy has been unable to locate case law that directly supports the "error in law" 
aspect of her appeal. Again, however, she urges the Court to apply common judicial 
sense, even in the absence of extant case law, and to determine that the District Court's 
allowing the evidence in question, which was not true "rebuttal" evidence," did, indeed, 
amount to a Rule 59(a)(7) "error in law." 
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I. THE EVIDENCE THAT THE LIGHT WAS EITHER GREEN OR 
YELLOW WHEN MR. STALEY ENTERED THE INTERSECTION 
WAS BY NO MEANS "OVERWHELxMING" 
Mr. Staley has acknowledged, in his Brief at 4, that 
[o]f primary dispute at trial was the color of the traffic signal governing 
the intersection at the time that Roundy made her left turn, and at the time 
that Staley entered the intersection. 
That is precisely why, as explained by Ms. Roundy7 in her Opening Brief, at 21-23, the 
overall credibility of Ms. Roundy, who was the only witness directly to testify that the 
light had to be red when Mr. Staley entered the intersection (e.g., Ms. Roundy's 
Opening Brief at 8-9), was so important to her case and is so important in this Appeal. 
It is, however, wrong for Mr. Staley to contend, as he does at page 9 of his Brief, that 
the "overwhelming evidence presented established that the light was green or yellow 
when Mr. Staley entered the intersection, and that Ms. Roundy has ,,note[d],/ that in her 
Opening Brief. Mr. Staley has offered no record citation for his "overwhelming 
evidence" proposition, and Ms. Roundy has nowhere acknowledged that to be a fact. 
The Court's independent review of the trial record (testimony of Mr. Staley, 
eyewitnesses Anita Sanchez and Maryann Jiminez, Salt Lake City Police Officer Robert 
Hawk, Ms. Roundy's accident reconstructionist John Burraston, and Mr. Staley's 
accident reconstructionist Ronald Probert) will, if the Court determines, in the absence 
of Mr. Staley's citation to the record, to embark on such an exercise, reveal that the 
evidence on the question was anything but "overwhelming." 
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J. THE SURPRISE EVIDENCE, THE IRREGULARITY IN THE 
PROCEEDINGS, AND THE ERROR IN LAW WERE NOT "HARM-
LESS" 
Ms. Roundy acknowledges that she, and this Court, must address Rule 61 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and its mandate that Rule 59 surprise, miscon-
duct, or error does not lead to the granting of a new trial if it is "harmless." In the 
circumstances of this case, however, this Court should recognize, and rule, that refusal 
to grant a new trial would be, in the words of Rule 61, "inconsistent with substantial 
justice/' 
Ms. Roundy acknowledges that the jury in this case did not get to 
damages and that therefore, by superficial analysis, the errors of which she complains, 
all dealing with the surveillance and surveillance-related evidence, had nothing to do 
with the verdict. Conspicuous and most telling, however, is the abject failure of 
Mr. Staley's Brief to address the contention, set forth in Ms. Roundy's Opening Brief 
(at 8; 22-23), that Ms. Roundy's supposed lack of credibility ~ as supposedly proved by 
the surveillance and surveillance-related evidence — was central to Mr. Staley's liability 
defense (given, again, the crucial fact that Ms. Roundy was the only witness who 
definitively testified that the light was red). Also conspicuous by its absence is any 
response by Mr. Staley to Ms. Roundy's discussion, in her Opening Brief at 25, of the 
case of Green v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., 59 F.2d 1029, 1033-34 (10th 
Cir. 1995), where the court reversed and remanded for new trial, on all issues, 
including liability issues, in a case where the jury found the defendant not negligent and 
where the pertinent issue on appeal dealt, superficially, only with damages. 
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Contrary to Mr. Staley's contention, made in his Brief at 22, the evidence 
at issue in this case did not address "only ... the damages element of Roundy's case." It 
dealt, by Mr. Staley's counsel's own acknowledgment, with all aspects of Ms. Roundy's 
credibility. See, particularly, the following excerpt from Mr. Staley's counsel's closing 
argument (also set forth at 27-28 of the Addendum to Ms. Roundy's Opening Brief): 
Now let's talk for a minute about plaintiffs injuries. And this goes ~ the 
discussion I want to have with you for a minute here goes to not only 
what injuries the plaintiff has, but also to the whole issue of her credibil-
ity in this case. 
Whether it has to do with the accident that occurred itself or her injuries 
or her medical treatment or whatever, because as I read from the instruc-
tions earlier, if you find that she's wilfully testified falsely, you can throw 
out all of her testimony, and all the evidence she provided. 
Mr. Staley's counsel's own words thus clearly bely Mr. Staley's contention that the 
evidence in question dealt only with and went only to damages. And, again, 
Ms. Roundy's credibility was crucial to her liability case. 
Mr. Staley relies, in connection with the "harmless error" aspect of his 
argument, on the case of McDougal v. McCammon, 455 S.E.2d 788 (W.Va. 1995). In 
McDougaL however, as noted by Mr. Staley, "the video tape in dispute did not affect 
the question of liability ...." Id. at 799. Here, and by Mr. Staley's counsel's own 
acknowledgment, via closing argument, it clearly did. And, as pointed out by the Court 
in McDougal, 
It must be noted that had the video tape been relevant to the liability 
issue, we would not hesitate to reverse the judgment of the trial court and 
remand for a new trial. The deliberate failure by the defendant not to 
supplement the discovery of such obviously pertinent materials in her 
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possession is error of such a magnitude warranting a new trial. 
Id. at 798, n. 13 (emphasis added). 
Here the surveillance and surveillance-related evidence was clearly 
relevant to the liability issue, and here this Court should reverse and remand for new 
trial. 
K. THE DIRECTED VERDICT ON MS. ROUNDYS PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES CLAIM 
Ms. Roundy urges the Court to include, in its remand Order, instructions 
to the District Court to allow her to proceed, in the new trial, with her punitive 
damages claim. If the evidence comes in ~ as it did in the first trial and as she expects 
it will in the new trial — from Ms. Roundy and from her accident reconstnictionist, who 
relied substantially on Ms. Roundy's version of the events, that Mr. Staley, driving a 
large vehicle, roared blindly, and without braking, into an intersection on a light that 
had been red for as long as two seconds, that will support a case for the imposition of 
punitive damages. It will then be for the jury in the new trial to determine, under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-18-1, and pursuant to the Court's observations in Gleave v. Denver & 
Rio Grande Western R. Co.. 749 P.2d 660, 670 (Utah App. 1988), discussed in 
Ms. Roundy's Opening Brief at 26-27, whether, if it determines the liability issues in 
Ms. Roundy's favor, and if it awards compensatory damages, an award of punitive 
damages is in order. This is not necessarily, contrary to Mr. Staley's apparent 
contention, a "simple negligence" case. And if the new jury chooses, as will be its 
prerogative, fully to accept Ms. Roundy's version of the facts and to reject contrary 
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versions of the facts, it will be free, even under the "clear and convincing evidence" 
standard on which it will be instructed, appropriately to impose an award of punitive 
damages. This is, it must be kept in mind, a directed verdict question, and it was not, 
and will not be, one on which reasonable persons could not differ. 
III. CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Under Rule 59(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("surprise, 
which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against"), and/or Rule 59(a)(1) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("irregularity in the proceedings ..."), and/or under Rule 
59(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("error in law"), Ms. Roundy is entitled 
to a new trial. Neither the Court's allowing the evidence nor Mr. Staley's counsel's 
conduct was "harmless," and Ms. Roundy was denied substantial justice. Also, 
Ms. Roundy's punitive damages claim was, and remains, viable. 
Ms. Roundy urges the Court, in the interest of fair play and in the interest 
of justice, to reverse and remand for new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this U_ day of January, 1999. 
PETER C. COLLINS 
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, Laina 
Roundy 
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